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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN READY MIX CONCRETE 
COl·IPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs 
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, JEANE C. 
LeCHEMINANT and 
Defendants, 
EDGAR KELLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIIW OF CASE 
Case No. 14811 
This is an action to foreclose a materialman's lien and for 
failure to post a bond as required by Title 14-2-1 et. seq. of 
.the Utah Code Annotated. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court without a jury. The District 
Court, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., found the issues in favor of 
plaintiff-respondent and awarded judgment for the sum of $558.21, 
attorney's fees of $300.00, costs of Court of $33.10 and a decree 
of foreclosure against the appellant. 
(1) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the judgment and decree of the Lower Court. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Western Ready Mix Concrete Company, the plaintiff and respondent, 
will hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiff, or where appro-
priate, by name. Mr. Edgar Kelley, the defendant and appellant, 
will hereinafter be referred to as the defendant, or where appropri· 
ate, by his name. Mr. Rodriguez, the contractor, will hereinafter 
be referred to as contractor, or where appropriate, by his name. 
"R" refers to a page reference in the record of the case. 
Exhibits are noted by number with "P" referring to plaintiff and 
"D" referring to defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Western Ready Mix, brought an action to foreclose 
a materialman' s lien and under the provisions of Title 14-2-1 of the 1 
i 
Utah Code Annotated against the defendant, Edgar Kelley. Mr. Kelley, 
as the owner of the real property located at 941 South Fourth East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, entered into a written contract for the con-
struction of improvements on said property with Richard J. Rodriguez,' 
on or about December 17, 1974. (R 80-82, Exhibit 1-P). Kelley 
paid Rodriguez a total of $3,408.00 for labor and materials under 
the contract with Rodriguez. (R 109, Exhibit 4-D). Rodriguez 
purchased from plaintiff cement which was used in construction of 
improvements on the re~l property owned by Mr. Kelley. (R ss-sG, 
Exhibit 2-P). A bond was not posted by either Mr. Kelley or Mr. 
(2) t 
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Rodriguez. (R 83, 85). Rodriguez did not pay plaintiff for the 
cement and plaintiff filed a notice of lien against the property of 
Mr. Kelley for the unpaid concrete. (R 95, Exhibit 3-P). Mr. 
Kelley made no payments to Western Ready Mix. (R 83). When Mr. 
Kelley made payments to Mr. Rodriguez, he did not designate the 
items of account to which the payment was to be applied. (R 109-
110). Mr. Rodriguez claimed he had purchased cement prior to the 
deliveries of January 9, 1975, and he was on a C.O.D. basis. 
(R 111). That he paid $600.00 to Mr. Van Roosendaal of plaintiff 
corporation on or before January 9th or 10th, 1975, or maybe before 
that. (R 111-112). Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-P showed Mr. Rodriguez 
was not on a C.O.D. basis, but a charge basis on January 10, 1975. 
The claimed payment by Mr. Rodriguez was shown to have been made 
on February 2, 197 5. (R 107). There was no payment to Mr. Rodriguez 
by Mr. Kelley on or about February 1, 1975 and the last payment was 
February 19, 197 5. (R 109-110, Exhibit 4-D). Mr. Rodriguez owed 
plaintiff the sum of $2,247.21 for concrete purchased on account 
for other jobs as well as the Kelley job, prior to, during and after 
the Kelley job. (R 89 ,115). 
Plaintiff takes issue with the statement of defendant in his 
brief at page 6 that Mr. Woodbury did not explain why the cement 
delivered of January 9th and 10th were not marked either C.O.D. 
or charge. Mr. Woodbury stated that the fact some of the invoices 
were not marked charge was due to the mechanical fault of the 
dispatcher. 
! 
L 
(R 105). 
(3) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT AS THE TRIER OF 
FACT WAS CORRECT IN LAW AND FACT 
The main trust of defendant's appeal is that the Trial Court 
rejected defendant's contention that Section 58-23-14.5 of the 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 applied to the facts and evidence of 
this case. The cited section provides: 
"Any owner or contractor in making any payment to a 
materialman, contractor or sub-contractor with whom 
he has a running account, or with whom he has more 
than one contract, or to whom he is otherwise indebted, 
shall designate the contract under which the payment is 
made or the items of account to which it is to be 
applied." 
"When a payment for materials or labor is made to a 
sub-contractor, or materialman, such sub-contractor 
or materialman shall demand of the person making such 
payment a designation of the account and the items of 
account to which such payment is to apply. In any case 
where a lien is claimed for materials furnished, or 
labor performed by a sub-contractor or materialman, 
it shall be a defense to such claim that a payment 
made, by the owner to the contractor for such materials 
has been so designated and paid over to such sub-
contractor or materialman, and that when such payment 
was received by such sub-contractor or materialman 
he did not demand a designation of the account and of 
the items of account to which such payment was applied." 
(Emphasis Added) . 
The defendant, Mr. Kelley, made no payments to Western Ready Mix. 
(R 83). At the time Mr. Kelley made payments to Mr. Rodriguez, 
the contractor, he did not designate the items of account to which 
it was to be applied, and that at no time when he made payments 
to Mr. Rodriguez did he designate for what the payments were made, 
whether it was for materials or labor, as required by the provisions 
(4) 
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of the above statute. (R 109-110). Whether or not there has been 
a designation by the contractor, Mr. Rodriguez, was questionable 
in the mind of the Court, as evidenced by the Court's memorandum 
decision, the findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R 32-33, 
38-41). The Lower Court, in its memorandum decision, found and 
concluded: 
"2. That defendant's motion to dismiss, which was 
again renewed at the conclusion of defendant's 
defense, should be denied upon the grounds and for 
the reasons that the Court is of the opinion that the 
section above referred to does not relate to the 
situation now before the Court, and furthermore that 
the testimony of Rodriguez offered by the defendants 
in connection with their defense does not jibe with 
the exhibits introduced and received by the Court, 
particularly those of the plaintiff, which records 
are kept in the usual course of business." -
It is clear that the Lower Court found that the testimony of Mr. 
Rodriguez as to the claimed designated payment to the plaintiff 
on the Kelley job was questionable in light of the other 
evidence presented. The Lower Court, as the trier of fact, has 
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the 
time that they testify, and as to whether or not the testimony 
given by the witness is sufficient to maintain the burden of proof 
required by law to sustain a defense or proposition of the party 
asserting the same. 
In this case, the defendant had the burden of producing evidence 
which would prove the defense asserted, and to persuade the trier 
Of fact that his evidence is more credible or entitled to the 
greater weight. In the case of Keesling v. Basamakis, 539 P. 2d 
l043, this Court stated: 
(5) 
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"A proponent of a proposition has the burden of pro-
ducing evidence which proves or tends to prove the 
proposition asserted and to persuade the trier of 
fact that his evidence is more credible or entitled 
to the greater weight." 
"Where proponent of a proposition has the burden of 
persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of 
the evidence, he carries that burden through out 
the trial and, having adduced sufficient evidence 
to show existence of the proposition, and having 
thus met his burden of production, he nevertheless 
suffers the risk or nonpersuasion or disbelief." 
(Emphasis Added). 
Conceding for the sake of argument only that defendant produced 
evidence which tended to prove the defense asserted, it is clear 
from the record that defendant failed in his burden of persuasion 
where considerable conflict existed in the evidence presented. 
Where the Lower Court, as the trier of fact, was in a much better 
position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and their tes-
timonies, and determine the weight to be given to the evidence 
presented, this Court is under duty to assume that the Trial Judge 
believed those aspects of the evidence which support his findings. 
Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P. 2d 890. It is well established in our law, 
that on appeal, evidence and all inferences which can reasonably 
be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in light favorable to findings 
made and conclusions drawn by the Trial Court. Cutler v. Bowen, 
543 P. 2d 1349; Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc. , 540 P. 2d 931; Tates, Inc. 
v. Little America Refinery Company, 535 P.2d 1228. 
Defendant had not only the burden of proof as to the defense 
claimed, but the burden of persuasion. It is clear from the 
memorandum decision of the Court and the findings of the court 
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that defendant failed in this burden. The testimony of the case, 
and the evidence presented, clearly support the Trial Court in its 
determination that Section 58-23-14.5 is not applicable in this 
case under the evidence presented, and the decision of the Lower 
court must be affirmed. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT 
ON ITS CLAIM UNDER SECTION 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953 
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that the Lower Court 
had found that Section 58-23-14.5 applied to this case under the 
facts and evidence presented, and was a defense to the lien action 
of plaintiff, plaintiff would have been entitled to a judgment 
against defendant on its claim under Section 14-2-2 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. Section 14-2-2 provides: 
"Any person subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and 
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as 
herein required, shall be personally liable to 
all persons who have furnished materials or per-
formed labor under the contract for the reasonable 
value of such materials furnished or labor per-
formed, ***." (Emphasis Added). 
Mr. Kelley was asked specifically whether or not he had requested 
a bond be posted by Mr. Rodriguez of any type. The testimony of 
Mr. Kelley was as follows: 
"(R 83). Q When you commenced the construction of 
these improvements did you request a bond be posted 
by Mr. Rodriguez of any type? 
A I discussed this with Richard at the 
time and he said that, "If you require a bond it 
will cost you more money." And I was anxious to 
save the money. Again I will just have to plead 
ignorance as far as this is concerned, which I know 
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is no excuse apparently. 
Q Did you post a bond, or did Mr. Rodriguez 
post a bond? 
A No. 
Q Neither one, is that correct? 
A No." 
The testimony of Mr. Rodriguez as to the posting of a bond was as 
follows: 
"(R 85). Q I take it you did not post a performance 
bond in connection with this contract? 
A No, I didn't." 
Mr. Rodriguez also testified that the concrete purchased by him was 
used in the improvements on Mr. Kelley's property. (R 86, Exhibit 
2-P). Mr. Rodriguez also testified that the amount of concrete 
that was used on the Kelley job was approximately 30 or 40 yards, 
and was for an amount in excess of $800.00. (R 85). 
A reading of Section 58-23-14.5 clearly indicates that it is 
not applicable to a claim under Section 14-2-2. In the case of 
Roberts Investment Company v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products 
Company, 22 U.2d 105, 449 P.2d 116, this Court held that the mater-
ialman was entitled to recover for materials furnished to the 
contractor and used in constructing improvements on the property 
·of the owner, even though the owner had obtained release of claims 
from the materialman at the time he paid bills for materials used 
by him, and the Court determined that the notice of lien sought 
to be foreclosed in the action was deficient and no claim would 
lie therefore. Thus, had the Lower Court found in favor of defend· 
ant on his motion to dismiss based upon the defense raised, it 
would not have precluded plaintiff from recovering judgment against 
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defendant Kelley on its claim under Section 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, 
in that no bond was posted by either the defendant or the contrac-
tor as required by law. There would not have been an award of 
attorney's fees had the Court based its judgment upon this portion 
of plaintiff's claim. 
POINT III 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANT WOULD NOT 
BE PROPER UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE 
Defendant claims that he is entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees should he be successful on this appeal and cites his authority 
therefore Section 38-1-18 U.C.A 1953, and the case of Palombi v. 
D & C Builders, 22 U.2d 297, 452 P.2d 325. 
At the time of trial, defendant failed to present any testimony 
to the Court as to what would be a reasonable attorney's fee should 
the Court find that defendant was the successful party under this 
action. It has been the law in the State of Utah for a consider-
able time that the award of a reasonable attorney's fee is a 
question of fact to be determined by the Lower Court upon evidence 
presented. In the case of Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance, 20 U.2d 156, 
434 P.2d 758, this Court stated: 
"Issues as to quantity and reasonable value of legal 
services rendered by attorneys to defendant were 
presented, precluding summary judgment for attorneys 
seeking to recover for services rendered ***·" 
In the case of Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 U.2d 401, 402 P.2d 699, 
the Court stated: 
"Question as to what is reasonable attorney's fees in 
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contested matter is not necessarily controlled by any 
set formula, and what is reasonable depends on number 
of factors, including amount in controversy, extent 
of services rendered and other factors which Trial 
Court is in advantaged position to judge." 
Thus, it can be seen that the claim for attorney's fees on the part 
of defendant, should defendant be successful on this appeal, would 
not be proper under the present status and circumstances of this 
I 
case. . ' 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony and evidence presented in this case clearly support11 
and sustains the Lower Court in its findings and conclusions of law 
as set forth in its memorandum decision. The Lower Court, as the 
trier of fact, properly concluded that Section 58-23-14.5 of the 
Utah Code Annotated did not apply to the facts and circumstances of 
this case, and the judgment rendered was proper. The decision of the 
Lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY 
~dd~ _11' 
E~. FKHAUSER , 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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